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Abstract
In this paper, we study the determinants of cross-country variation in the level
of international reserves over 1981-95. Con￿rming intuition, trade openness is easily
the most important variable. There is also some evidence that ￿nancial deepening is
associated with an increase in the reserves ratio. Smaller and more volatile industrial
countries hold larger reserves than their larger, less volatile counterparts. In addition,
more indebted developing countries tend to have smaller reserve ratios. We view these
results as establishing some interesting stylized facts that may be helpful in informing
future theoretical modelling of reserves behavior.
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www.economics.tcd.ie/plane. Tel.: 353-1-6082259. Fax: 353-1-6772503.The 1990s international ￿nancial crises have led to a renewal of interest in the behavior
of international reserves. For instance, it is noteworthy that those countries (Singapore,
Taiwan) with the largest reserves holdings were the least aﬀected by speculative pressures
during the Asian crisis. In this paper, we seek to understand the empirical determinants of
the cross-country variation in the level of international reserves. We view this as a natural
￿rst step in establishing some stylized facts concerning the country characteristics that
in￿uence the level of reserves.
Our approach is positive in approach: we study the cross-sectional variation in the
actual level of reserves. As such, it may be the case that reserves policies are non-optimal
so the estimated equations need not re￿ect the ￿ideal￿ sensitivity of reserves to the various
determinants. In future work, structural estimation may make progress on this issue but a
natural starting point is to establish some stylized facts, via reduced-form estimation. As is
outlined in section 2, a large number of variables may be identi￿ed as in￿uencing reserves
and we take an eclectic approach in this paper by studying a wide range of potential
determinants.
With respect to the previous literature on the determinants of international reserves,
there was an explosion of empirical papers in the 1960s and early 1970s (see Kenen and
Yudin 1965; Kelly 1970; Flanders 1971; Grubel 1971; Frenkel 1974). More recent studies
are provided by Landell-Mills (1989) and Bordo and Eichengreen (1998). These papers
typically study a much smaller number of countries and a much narrower set of explanatory
variables than are considered in this paper. For instance, Bordo and Eichengreen (1998)
is the closest to our study but it includes only twenty-one countries and considers only
country size, trade openness and volatility measures as potential determinants of reserves.
These authors emphasize higher-frequency data by considering a pool of annual data and
study the absolute level of reserves rather than the reserve-GDP ratio.
Previewing our empirical results, we con￿rm intuition by ￿nding that trade openness
is easily the most important factor in explaining cross-country variation in reserves accu-
mulation. However, there is also some evidence that ￿nancial development and, at least
2among the industrial countries, country size and external volatility are associated with
an increase in the reserves/GDP ratio. An interesting ￿nding for developing countries is
that there is a negative partial correlation between the level of external debt and reserves.
We view these results as establishing some empirical relationships that may stimulate new
theoretical modelling of reserves behavior.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 1, we describe and motivate the
set of determinants examined in this paper. Section 2 reports summary data and analyses
the regression results. Finally, concluding comments are oﬀered in section 3.
1 Determinants of Reserves
The extant literature identi￿es a range of variables that may in￿uence reserve holdings.
Since there is no consensus theoretical model of reserves behavior, we take a broad approach
and attempt to include a large number of these potential determinants in the empirical
work. These are: output per capita; trade openness; country size; export volatility; ￿nancial
development; capital controls; the exchange rate regime; an oil dummy; and external debt
variables. In this section, we motivate the selection of these regressors and describe our
empirical measures.
Output per capita is included as a general control variable for the level of development.
GDP per capita is measured in 1990 constant US dollars and is taken from the IMF￿s
International Financial Statistics (IFS)C D - R O M .
Trade openness is an obvious candidate. Reserves are the ￿￿nancing option of last
resort￿ in covering import demand, providing a natural link between trade openness and
reserve levels. In measuring trade openness, the raw volume of trade is potentially suspect,
since reserves policy and trade policy may be jointly determined. Accordingly, we employ
the adjusted index constructed by Frankel and Romer (1999) that attempts to capture the
natural (policy-free) level of trade openness by using the sum of the predicted bilateral
trade shares from the geographical determinants in a gravity model.
We check for scale eﬀects by including country size. If the absolute level of international
3reserves matters in deterring speculators, a larger country may be able to survive with a
lower reserves-GDP ratio. Country size is measured by population (in millions), since we
already control for output per capita. External volatility provides a prudential motive to
hold reserves. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate of export
revenues, in current US dollars. By using current dollars, the measure captures both
volume and price volatility in exports.
The 1990s crises have highlighted the close relationship between domestic ￿nancial
development and exposure to external crises (eg Goldfajn and Valdes 1997). To the ex-
tent that the liabilities of the domestic ￿nancial sector are partly denominated in foreign
currency, ￿nancial deepening should be matched by an increase in international reserves.
We measure ￿nancial depth by the M2/GDP ratio.1 Population, export revenue and the
M2/GDP ratio are taken from the IFS CD-ROM.
We include two policy variables in some of the speci￿cations. One is the fraction of
years during the sample period in which capital controls were in place. The other is the
fraction of years in which a ￿oating exchange rate regime is in place. The impact of capital
controls is potentially ambiguous. On the one side, capital controls may reduce the risk
of speculative attack, reducing the need to hold reserves as a bulwark against speculators.
On the other, capital controls may prevent access to external credit sources, increasing the
importance of reserves in ￿nancing external transactions. With respect to the exchange rate
regime, fewer reserves are required, the weaker is the commitment to defend a given value
for the exchange rate. The capital controls and exchange rate regime data are taken from
Cottarelli and Giannini (1997), which is based on underlying IMF classi￿cations. Although
these are policy variables, we do not believe that decisions concerning capital controls and
the exchange rate regime are strongly in￿uenced by the endogenously-determined level of
reserves over the long horizon studied in our cross-sectional approach.2 Rather, any line of
causation is more plausibly from these ￿meta￿ regime decisions to reserves behavior.
We also include a zero-one dummy variable to indicate countries that are heavily depen-
dent on oil revenues. If we think of such countries as enjoying a temporarily high income
4stream, it may wish to accumulate external assets, including liquid (reserve) holdings. The
identi￿cation of oil countries is based on the IMF￿s World Economic Outlook classi￿cation.
Finally, we consider external debt indicators for a developing-country subsample. We
examine total external debt, short-term debt and the ratio of short-term to total debt.
Again, the relation between debt and reserves can go either way. Following Eaton and
Gersovitz (1979), debt may serve as a substitute for reserves: if external transactions can be
￿nanced by debt, fewer reserves need be held. However, reserves may be required collateral
in raising external debt. Moreover, the level of reserves may be important in stabilising
the external debt market (especially at short maturities): if liquid assets are inadequate,
rollover risk and the probability of creditor panics are increased (eg see Feldstein 1998).
The debt variables are taken from the World Bank￿s Global Development Finance database.
2 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Results
We estimate a cross-sectional speci￿cation, using data averaged over 1981-95. We focus
on the cross-section, since we want to abstract from cyclical ￿uctuations in reserves (e.g.
induced by boom-bust patterns in capital ￿ows or speculative attacks) and many of the






= α + βZi + ui (1)
where Zi is the set of control variables. Estimation is by OLS, with heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors.
The data set consists of 102 countries, listed in Table 1. (Not all variables are available
for all countries, so the number of countries in each regression varies accordingly.) Figure
1 is a histogram of the reserves/GDP ratio, dividing countries into four groups. Group 1
contains the 48 countries with average reserves/GDP ratios below 5 percent; group 2 is
the 33 countries with ratios between 5 and 10 percent; there are 15 countries with ratios
between 10 and 20 percent in group 3; only six countries have ratios above 20 percent in
group 4. Accordingly, the data clearly indicate considerable cross-country heterogeneity in
5the reserves/GDP ratio.
Table 2 reports summary statistics and Table 3 the simple correlations between the (log)
reserves/output ratio and the various determinants. GDP per capita (GDP-pc) and country
size (Size) are transformed into logs; trade openness (Open), ￿nancial depth (FinDepth),
total debt (Total Debt), short-term debt (ST Debt) and the ratio of short-term debt to total
debt (ST Ratio) are measured as ratios; volatility (Volatility) is in percentage terms; capital
controls (CAP) and the ￿exible exchange rate regime (Float) variables are respectively the
fractions of years in which capital controls exist and a ￿o a t i n ge x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei si n
place; ￿nally, the oil dummy (Oil) is a zero-one dummy in which one denotes a country
heavily dependent on oil revenues. In line with the theoretical discussion, the correlations
are signi￿cantly positive with output per capita, trade openness, ￿nancial depth and the
oil dummy and signi￿cantly negative with country size and the exchange rate ￿exibility
dummy. The correlations are weaker with export volatility and the various debt variables.
The regression results for the full sample are shown in Table 4. The dependent variables
is the (log) reserves/GDP ratio. GDP per capita, in logs, is included as a general control
variable in all the regressions in columns (1)-(10); trade openness is included in columns
(2)-(10); the other regressors are added on an individual basis in columns (3)-(8); column
(9) includes all the regressors; and column (10) drops country size, in view of its naturally
strong negative correlation with trade openness. Column (1) reveals a signi￿cantly positive
relation: richer countries accumulate larger reserve/GDP ratios. Trade openness is added
to the speci￿cation in column (2).5 The explanatory power of the regression sharply im-
proves, with the adjusted R2 rising from 0.063 to 0.275. Both GDP per capita and trade
openness are individually signi￿cant. Indeed, trade openness is individually signi￿cant and
its point estimate is quite stable across columns (2)-(10), with the exception of column (9)
that includes all the explanatory variables, including country size. GDP per capita loses
signi￿cance in those speci￿cations that include variables such as ￿nancial depth which are
highly correlated with the level of development.
In columns (3)-(10), the other regressors are much less important in terms of improving
6overall explanatory power. In columns (3) and (9), country size enters negatively; its p-
value is 0.105 in column (3) and 0.007 in column (9): larger countries hold fewer reserves.
In the full sample, there is some evidence that higher reserves are correlated with ￿nancial
deepening, which is signi￿cant in columns (5) and (9). There is no evidence that volatility,
capital controls, the exchange rate regime or oil dependence independently in￿uences the
level of reserves. One explanation is that some of these variables are quite correlated with
the level of GDP per capita, which is already included in the speci￿cation.
Table 5 examines the subset of industrial countries. Within this high-income sample,
GDP per capita has no impact on variation in reserve/GDP ratios. The eﬀect of openness
is very similar to the full sample results: rich open economies have higher ratios than rich
closed economies. The evidence on the negative impact of country size is also very similar
to the full sample results. The evidence on ￿nancial depth is slightly weaker and again
there is no evidence of an independent eﬀect of capital controls or the exchange regime.
(We do not include the oil dummy since none of the industrial countries is classi￿ed as
being heavily oil dependent.) The main diﬀerence with respect to the full sample is that
there is some evidence that export volatility has a positive impact on the reserve ratio: the
volatility variables is individually signi￿cant in columns (4) and (9). This positive relation
accords with the prudential motive signalled by theoretical considerations.
We restrict the sample to developing countries in Table 6. Not surprisingly, the results
are very similar to those for the full sample. The main exception is that country size is
not individually signi￿cant within the developing country subsample, suggesting that its
negative role in the full sample is emanating from the very low reserves/GDP ratios of the
largest industrial countries. (The average reserve/GDP ratio over 1981-95 for the US was
only 0.8 percent and it was only 2.5 percent for Japan.)
In Table 7, we add external debt variables to the speci￿cation for those developing
countries that appear in the World Bank￿s Global Development Finance database. In
columns (1)-(3), we add total external debt as a ratio to GNP; in columns (4)-(6), we
consider only the short-term debt ratio; ￿nally, in columns (7)-(9), we include both total
7external debt and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. The results are quite consistent
for the three diﬀerent debt measures. Once we control for other variables, external debt
has a signi￿cantly negative partial correlation with the reserves ratio. Moreover, it is clear
from columns (7)-(9) that what matters is total external debt: holding ￿xed the total, the
composition between short-term and long-term does not matter.6 T h ef a c tt h a td e b te n t e r s
negatively is consistent with debt substituting for reserves as a means of ￿nancing external
transactions or with a high debt implying a high opportunity cost to holding reserves.
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the determinants of cross-country variation in the level of in-
ternational reserves over 1981-95. Predictably, trade openness is easily the most important
variable: for example, the estimate in column (2) in Table 4 suggests that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in trade openness from its sample mean (e.g. from 22.9 percentage
points to 41.4 percentage points) leads to a 44 percent increase in the reserves/GDP ratio
(from its sample mean of 8.6 percentage points to 12.4 percentage points). There is also
some evidence that ￿nancial deepening is associated with an increase in the reserves ratio.
Smaller and more volatile industrial countries hold larger reserves than their larger, less
volatile counterparts. In addition, more indebted developing countries tend to have smaller
reserve ratios.
We view the partial correlations generated by this cross-sectional study as helpful in
establishing some stylized facts concerning the cross-country variation in reserves accumula-
tion. Such empirical correlations can inform theoretical work on the modelling of reserves
behavior. However, it would be desirable to explore estimation of structural models to
make further progress. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that the determinants of
reserves are evolving: in the wake of the 1990s crises, growing prominence is likely to be
given to the scale of short-term external liabilities in determining the appropriate level of
reserves. Finally, another recent innovation that could be studied in future work is the
growing role played by ￿nancial engineering (credit lines, swaps and other derivatives) as
8a partial substitute for reserves in national liquidity management policies.
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10Notes
1This is a standard measure of ￿nancial development and has the advantage of being widely available.
2See Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Ghosh et al (1995) respectively for empirical studies of capital
controls and exchange rate regime decisions. Of course, during crisis episodes, a collapse of an exchange
rate peg is associated with a loss of reserves but such short-term correlations should wash out in the
￿fteen-year averaged data that we study.
3The lack of time-series variation would make ￿xed-eﬀects panel estimation uninformative.
4The log speci￿cation is intended to reduce the role of the countries with extremely high reserve-GDP
ratios (see Figure 1). A levels speci￿cation gives quite similar results.
5Very similar results are obtained if the trade openness ratio is entered in log form.
6T h er i s eo fp r i v a t es e c t o r￿nancing in the 1990s and the role played by short-term debt in the Tequila
and Asian crises suggests that provisioning against short-term debt may increase over time.
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Figure 1: Histogram of RES/GDP ratio. Category 1 is ratio of less than 5%; 2 less than
10%; 3 between 10%-20%; 4 greater than 20%.
14Table 1: Country List
Algeria El Salvador Madagascar Saudi Arabia
Argentina Ethiopia Malawi Seychelles
Australia Finland Malaysia Sierra Leone
Austria France Mali Singapore
Bahrain Gabon Malta South Africa
Bangladesh Gambia Mauritania Spain
Barbados Germany Mauritius Sri Lanka
Belgium Greecce Mexico Sweden
Benin Guatemala Morocco Swaziland
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tanzania
Botswana Guyana Myanmar Thailand
Brazil Haiti Nepal Togo
Burundi Honduras Netherlands Trinidad/Tobago
Canada Hungary New Zealand Tunisia
Cent. Afr. Rep. Iceland Niger Turkey
Chad India Norway Uganda
Chile Indonesia Oman UAE
China Ireland Pakistan UK
Colombia Israel Panama USA
Costa Rica Italy Papua NG Uruguay
Cyprus Jamaica Paraguay Venezuela
Denmark Japan Peru Zaire
Djibouti Jordan Philippines Zambia
Dom. Rep. Kenya Poland Zimbabwe
Ecuador Korea Portugal
Egypt Kuwait Rwanda
15Table 2: Summary Statistics
RES-pc GDP-pc Open Size Volatility FinDepth
Mean 553.88 5457.76 22.90 36.90 0.19 0.44
StDev 1134.53 6859.63 18.51 123.00 0.13 0.24
Max 8390.49 26586.86 98.14 101.00 0.79 1.44
Min 2.42 133.06 2.30 0.06 0.07 0.05
Total Debt ST Debt ST Ratio CAP Float Oil
Mean 81.50 10.80 14.13 0.68 0.49 0.08
StDev 72.20 13.30 10.16 0.41 0.42 0.27
Max 494.80 99.20 63.31 1.00 1.00 1.00
Min 11.60 0.29 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00













Correlations with (log) reserves-GDP ratio. See text for de￿nitions of variables and data
sources.
17Table 4: Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
c -4.2 -4.3 -2.3 -4.2 -3.9 -3.8 -3.6 -4.2 1.02 -3.03
(0.41) (.37) (1.2) (.41) (.36) (.53) (.51) (.37) (.62) (.59)
gdp-pc 0.16 0.105 0.113 0.102 0.03 0.05 0.046 0.086 -0.098 -0.055
(.055) (.05) (.049) (.049) (.053) (.063) (.059) (.05) (.068) (.069)
open 0.024 0.016 0.024 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.005 0.021
(.005) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.009) (.006)
size -0.114 -0.23
(.07) (.08)
volatility -0.064 -0.39 -0.38
(.9) (1.22) (1.48)
￿ndepth 0.644 1.38 0.763
(.38) (.53) (.51)
cap -0.112 -0.14 -0.075
(.246) (.25) (.25)
￿x -0.3 -0.15 -0.23
(.269) (.25) (.26)
oil 0.48 0.43 0.51
(.275) (.43) (.42)
adj.R2 0.063 0.275 0.289 0.264 0.253 0.273 0.288 0.285 0.327 0.274
SE 0.91 0.8 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.8 0.79 0.77 0.8
N 102 102 102 101 97 78 78 102 76 76
Dependent variable is (log) reserves-GDP ratio. OLS estimation with robust standard
errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. See text for de￿nitions of variables and data
sources.
18Table 5: Industrial Country Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
c -0.01 -0.5 2.59 -3.25 -0.94 -1.8 -0.66 1.9 -4.4
(3.3) (2.8) (2.9) (2.96) (2.81) (3.07) (2.74) (5.1) (3.02)
gdp-pc -0.31 -0.324 -0.293 -0.092 -0.311 -0.2 -0.288 -0.144 0.012
(.35) (.302) (.292) (.31) (.285) (.32) (.29) (.35) (.3)
open 0.031 0.019 0.028 0.032 0.03 0.028 0.009 0.026
(.012) (.01) (.011) (.012) (.011) (.014) (.009) (.011)
size -0.19 -0.27
(.11) (.15)
volatility 4.3 1.21 3.9
(1.5) (2.69) (1.7)
￿ndepth 0.485 1.2 0.305
(.528) (.69) (.533)
cap 0.34 -0.024 0.281
(.32) (.3) (.341)
￿x -0.212 -0.285 -0.09
(.344) (.283) (.28)
adj.R2 -0.013 0.336 0.446 0.487 0.323 0.336 0.314 0.534 0.426
SE 0.68 0.55 0.5 0.48 0.556 0.551 0.56 0.46 0.51
N 2 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 2
Dependent variable is (log) reserves-GDP ratio. OLS estimation with robust standard
errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. See text for de￿nitions of variables and data
sources.
19Table 6: Developing Country Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
c -5.3 -4.9 -3.8 -4.8 -4.6 -4.3 -4.4 -4.8 -0.46 -3.3
(.56) (.52) (1.5) (.53) (.49) (.84) (.79) (.64) (1.9) (.88)
gdp-pc 0.329 0.219 0.214 0.21 0.145 0.163 0.181 0.188 0.006 0.045
(.081) (.081) (.08) (.08) (.079) (.113) (.114) (.1) (.12) (.13)
open 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.014 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.0015 0.014
(.005) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.015) (.009)
size -0.063 -0.17
(.082) (.11)
volatility -0.414 -0.473 -0.672
(.838) (1.15) (1.31)
￿ndepth 1.03 1.71 1.22
(.533) (1.03) (.91)
cap -0.38 -0.37 -0.38
(.29) (.35) (.33)
￿x -0.367 -0.23 -0.37
(.341) (.35) (.37)
oil 0.262 0.256 0.256
(.348) (.511) (.516)
adj.R2 0.161 0.299 0.295 0.29 0.29 0.304 0.296 0.295 0.302 0.292
SE 0.92 0.84 0.84 0.846 0.815 0.871 0.875 0.84 0.864 0.87
N 8 08 08 07 97 55 65 68 05 45 4
Dependent variable is (log) reserves-GDP ratio. OLS estimation with robust standard
errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. See text for de￿nitions of variables and data
sources.
20Table 7: Debt Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
c -4.1 2.8 -2.3 -4.3 -0.23 -3.5 -4.3 1.5 -2
(0.8) (2.5) (1.0) (.63) (1.94) (.88) (0.8) (2.5) (1)
gdp-pc 0.11 -0.13 1.29 0.142 0.075 0.14 0.167 -0.005 0.12
(0.11) (0.93) (.10) (.096) (.121) (.15) (.132) (.15) (.17)
Open 0.019 -.01 0.292 0.019 -0.0031 0.012 0.02 -0.003 0.015
(.006) (.02) (.152) (.006) (.017) (.01) (.0065) (.018) (.01)
Size -0.275 -0.18 -0.23
(.14) (.12) (.13)
Volatility -0.237 -0.73 -0.23 -0.57 -0.24 -0.63
(1.42) (1.6) (1.4) (1.6) (1.47) (1.63)
FinDepth 1.61 0.8 1.67 1.1 1.91 1.39
(1.12) (.9) (1.11) (.89) (1.01) (.82)
CAP -0.12 -0.18 -0.27 -0.31 -0.17 -0.23
(.34) (.33) (.34) (.32) (.35) (.31)
Float -0.32 -0.51 -0.42 -0.56 -0.34 -0.49
(.35) (.37) (.37) (.38) (.35) (.35)
Oil 0.006 0.1 -0.039 -0.01 -0.074 -0.03
(.6) (.64) (.63) (.67) (.63) (.67)
Total Debt -0.142 -0.93 -0.78 -0.14 -1 -0.9
(.167) (.37) (.39) (.18) (.34) (.37)
ST Debt -1.1 -4.8 -4.9
(1.0) (2.2) (2.3)
ST Ratio -1.2 -2.1 -2.9
(1.6) (1.9) (1.9)
adj.R2 0.168 0.201 0.227 0.182 0.254 0.234 0.168 0.29 0.259
SE 0.84 10.92 0.85 0.835 0.835 0.843 0.842 0.81 0.83
N 6 9 4 8 4 8 6 94 84 86 94 8 4 8
Dependent variable is (log) reserves-GDP ratio. OLS estimation with robust standard
errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. See text for de￿nitions of variables and data
sources.
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